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Abstract
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commit-
ment can improve cooperation in endogenously formed partnerships facing
a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual’s (a) opportu-
nity to commit to their partner, (b) the cost of dissolving committed partner-
ships, and (c) the distribution of these dissolution costs between partners.
Our findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase coopera-
tion and welfare in committed partnerships . The introduction of relatively
large and equally split costs yields similar gains. In contrast, when costs
to dissolve committed partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to
break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare.
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1. Introduction
We conduct an experimental study to investigate how pledges of commitment in-
fluence cooperation in a social dilemmawith endogenously formed partnerships.
The social dilemma we study is a modification of the standard linear voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM) (Isaac et al. (1985)).1 The VCM provides a sim-
ple framework that allows for a straightforward measurement of self-interested
versus partnership-orientated behaviour. We augment the standard design by
periodically introducing commitment and regrouping phases.2 In commitment
phases, subjects in uncommitted partnerships simultaneously choose whether to
pledge commitment to their partner. When both partners choose to commit, a
committed partnership forms. Both subjects remain in a committed partnership
until the end of the game, or until one (or both) choose to dissolve the partnership
during a regrouping phase. In regrouping phases, subjects choose whether to
stay in their current partnership or to dissolve the partnership and be rematched
to a new partner. Subjects whose partnership has been dissolved are rematched
to new partners according to their preferences using the stable marriage mecha-
nism (Bayer(forthcoming)).
Our experimental design allows us to disentangle the effects of the two interre-
lated parts a pledge of commitment entails: the pledge itself, and costs of dissolv-
ing a committed partnership. A pledge of commitment by itself could serve to
increase cooperation through signalling cooperative intentions or through serv-
ing a reassuring role. However, the formation of a committed partnership rarely
involves only costless, mutual pledges of commitment. Costs are typically in-
curred when the partnership fails and needs to be dissolved. When dissolution
costs are present, pledging commitment indicates a willingness to bear a cost if
the partnership is unsuccessful. This potentially strengthens the credibility of a
pledge of commitment, leading to higher cooperation levels.
We also want to understand the role of the size and distribution of dissolution
costs that are incurred by committed partners. Holding the distribution of costs
between partners fixed, the effect of an increase in total cost of dissolution on
cooperation is ambiguous. A partner may increase contributions to avoid being
broken upwith and avoid the resulting higher costs. On the other hand, choosing
1Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) provide excellent surveys of the existing literature on
public goods game experiments and various modifications that aid or hinder sustaining cooper-
ation in this environment.
2Previous studies of endogenous group formation including Coricelli et al. (2004), Ahn et al.
(2008), Ahn et al. (2009), Page et al. (2005) and Bayer(forthcoming) find that the introduction of
endogenous group formation increases cooperation and welfare when compared to exogenous
regrouping protocols (See Hauk and Nagel (2001) for an exception to this result). Our focus
is different: We ask whether the addition of pledges of commitment in an endogenous group
formation setting can provide additional increases in cooperation and welfare.
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to dissolve a partnership is more costly, decreasing the probability a subject dis-
solves the partnership providing their partner an incentive to cooperate less. The
distribution of costs between partners upon dissolution should also play a role in
determining cooperation levels among committed partners. When the cost bur-
den falls asymmetrically on the instigator of the dissolution he may be less likely
to dissolve perceiving costs of dissolution too high or the distribution unfair. An-
ticipating this reluctance, there is scope for partners to behave opportunistically
and decrease cooperation.
Qualitative aspects of the experimental design seem well suited to stylized fea-
tures of marriage market and some business partnerships. In the marriage mar-
ket individuals learn about the cooperativeness of their partner in an initial dat-
ing stage and may decide to pledge commitment through marriage. Dissolving
a marriage through divorce is often costly and the size and distribution of these
costs may fall differently in each relationship. Our set-up speaks to how, and
whether these costs may influence the ultimate success of the relationship. Busi-
ness partnerships can also be thought of as an in-kind social dilemma with costly
dissolution, where partners trade-off work to enhance the value of the company
versus working for oneself or shirking. Dissolving these partnerships may either
be cost-free via informal agreements or costly via lost investments and/or costs
to retrieve these investments. These costs may fall unevenly if one partner is
more invested than the other, or equally if investment levels are similar for each
partner.
Our results show pledges of commitment by themselves are associated with in-
creases in cooperation in committed partnerships and translate into improve-
ments in welfare. The increase in cooperation comes via an ability for partners
to signal cooperative intentions. Once committed, subjects act on these inten-
tions with high contributions. When dissolution is costly we found committed
partnerships featured higher contributions when the breakup cost was equally
shared. The introduction of these costs meant that fewer subjects were willing
to commit, limiting the gains in welfare. Welfare gains are only found when
the total dissolution burden is relatively high. Few committed partnerships in-
creased contributions in response to the threat of costly breakups, bringing wel-
fare to a level equal to when committed partnerships were costless to dissolve.
In contrast, committed partnerships are less cooperative than partnerships in a
‘commitment-free’ benchmark when costs to dissolve the partnership fall asym-
metrically on the instigator. Subjects use the reluctance of their partner to dis-
solve to decrease contributions and free ride, leaving committed partnerships
caught in a low contributions trap.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the re-
search questions our experiment is designed to address. Section 3 details the
experimental design. Results are contained in Section 4. Section 5 contains final
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remarks and concludes.
2. Research Questions
The objectives of the study are two fold. The first objective is general: to investi-
gate whether pledges of commitment can increase and sustain cooperation when
partnership formation is endogenous. We are interested in whether a pledge
itself is enough to increase cooperation, and whether the presence of costs to dis-
solve the partnership leads to further benefits.
Research Question 1. Do pledges of commitment increase cooperation in endogenously
formed partnerships?
Research Question 2. Does the presence of dissolution costs further increase coopera-
tion of committed partnerships?
The second, more focussed objective, is to investigate how cooperation is influ-
enced by the size and distribution of costs attached to dissolving committed part-
nerships. Along the cost dimension, we vary the size and distribution of the dis-
solution costs between partners. We are interested in how changes in the total
cost burden, holding distribution fixed, influence the cooperation of committed
partnerships. We also study the effect of asymmetries in the distribution for a
fixed cost burden on cooperative behaviour.
ResearchQuestion 3. How important is the total size of the cost to dissolve a committed
partnership in influencing cooperation?
Research Question 4. Do asymmetric dissolution costs effect cooperation in committed
partnerships?
3. Experiment Design
Each session features 32 periods of interaction, divided into eight sequences of
four periods. In each sequence all partnerships play four identical linear VCM
games.3 At the conclusion of a sequence subjects decide to dissolve their cur-
rent partnership or remain together for the subsequent sequence. Subjects whose
3Our experiment uses a public good game with two person groups rather than the more
common four player groups. This design choice is to simplify the interpretation of pledges of
commitment and dissolution. In our two-player set-up pledges of commitment are can be inter-
preted as a pledge to on person, and dissolution decisions as the result of the behaviour of one
person - the subject’s partner. This simplification is not possible in larger groups, where decisions
are made in response to group behaviour and is not solely attributable the decisions made by one
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partnership is dissolved face a preference input and regrouping phase. Those
in partnerships which did not dissolve enter directly into the next sequence. In
experimental treatments, subjects in new or existing uncommitted partnerships
face a commitment decision at the beginning of a sequence, prior to the VCM
stages. In one control treatment we remove the commitment phase at the begin-
ning of the sequence. An additional control treatment removes also the commit-
ment phase and replaces endogenous regrouping protocol with random match-
ing. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the order of play in a typical sequence.
Figure 1: Timeline of a Typical Sequence in the Game
Sequence Begins Sequence Ends
Rematching 
  Decision
Commitment 
    Decision
VCM gameVCM gameVCM gameVCM game
We now explain the three decision stages subjects face in each sequence, starting
with the VCM.
3.1 The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
The parametric structure of the VCM draws heavily on Bayer(forthcoming) and
Coricelli et al. (2004). At the beginning of each period subjects are endowed with
100 units of experimental currency. A subject chooses how to allocate the en-
dowment between a private account, which is theirs to keep, and a partnership
account, which yields profit for both partners. We refer to the amount allocated
to the partnership account as the subject’s contribution. Each unit contributed
to the group account, ci 2 [0; 100] generates 0:8 units of profit for each part-
ner. The profit arising to each individual from the partnership’s contributions
is 0:8(ci + cj). Payoffs are symmetric across partners and allocation decisions are
made simultaneously. Subject’s profit from each VCM stage is:
i(ci; cj) := 100  ci + 0:8(ci + cj); i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j:
group member. We find similar improvements in welfare between exogenous and endogenous
group formation protocols in our partner treatments compared to the existing literature using
four player or more groups, indicating that effects on cooperation in our treatments may be gen-
eralizable to larger groups.
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After the contribution decisions have been made, they are revealed to both part-
ners and the game continues. Each partner is informed about the total contri-
bution to the partnership account, the individual contributions of both partners,
and their own profit from that period.
The payoff structure generates a social dilemma because the net return from con-
tributing one unit into the partnership’s account is negative ( 0:2) whilst the
net social return of one unit contributed is positive (0:6). Average contributions
are an indicator for a partnership’s success at overcoming the social dilemma
because aggregate partnership welfare (W ) increases linearly with the average
contribution of each partner,
W = 200 + (0:6)(ci + cj)
= 200 + 1:2c:
3.2 Pledges of Commitment
Subjects in experimental treatments face a commitment decision at the beginning
of each sequence of four VCM games. Each partner in a newly formed part-
nership or surviving uncommitted partnership has the opportunity to pledge
commitment to their current partner. Subjects are asked simultaneously whether
they wanted to pledge commitment to their partner. If both partners chose to
pledge commitment, a committed partnership formed. Partners were informed
of the outcome and remained in a committed partnership until it was dissolved
in a regrouping phase or the experiment ended. In all other situations subjects
remained in an uncommitted partnership. When one partner wanted to commit
and the other did not, the willing partner was informed his counterpart was ‘not
willing to commit right now.’ If both partners decided not to commit, both were
informed of the outcome. Subjects then progressed to the next four VCMperiods.
3.3 Regrouping
At the conclusion of each sequence all subjects could be regrouped. In one con-
trol treatment subjects were regrouped randomly by the computer and continued
onto the next sequence. In all other treatments subjects could choose to dissolve
their current partnership.4 A partnership was dissolved if one or both partners
chose to dissolve. Subject’s whose partnership dissolved enter into a pool of
4In period 1 of each session, ‘types’ and an initial grouping were randomly determined by the
computer. Each initial grouping features two partners, each of a different type. In a regrouping
phase subjects with different types could form a partnership. Subjects could only see potential
partners who were of a different type from themselves.
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‘singles’ to be regrouped. There was no cost of dissolving an uncommitted part-
nership. The cost of dissolving committed partnerships varied across treatments,
as shown in Table 1.
All ‘single’ subjects were regrouped according to the stable marriage algorithm
(Gale and Shapley (1962)). Subjects were shown information about the average
contributions from the previous sequence of four VCM games of ‘single’ subjects
to form preferences over potential partners.5 Subjects ranked potential partners
in order of desirability.6 When the ranking process was complete, the matching
algorithm used these preferences to produce a stable matching. Subjects were in-
formed that they had been regrouped and entered into the next sequence without
information about who they had been matched with. They could only use indi-
rect inference by observing their partner’s contributions over the next sequence.
The mechanism underlying group formation is quite complex. For this reason
instructions provided to subjects do not fully explain how the algorithm works
to avoid confusion and noisy regrouping behaviour. The regrouping procedure
is described in the instructions as follows:7,8
‘The computer will collect the rankings from every ‘single’ and rematch all ‘singles’
according to these rankings. The partner you are matched with is determined by your
preferences and the preferences of all other ‘singles.’ The computer is programmed to give
you the best partner available.’
3.4 Treatments
We implement six treatments to investigate the research questions posed in Sec-
tion 2. Treatment differences are summarized in Table 1. The Random Matching
treatment and No Commitment treatment serve as controls. Four experimental
treatments add periodic commitment opportunities to the No Commitment treat-
ment and vary in the cost structure of dissolving committed partnerships.
5The decision to provide information on the average contributions of subjects over the pre-
vious sequence reflects an important compromise. When only contribution history from the pre-
vious sequence is used as information in regrouping phases, subjects are able to escape any rep-
utation attained during sequences that occurred earlier. The advantage of the approach imple-
mented is that both accidents and interactions with low contributing partners are removed from
a subject’s history quickly.
6Subjects rank potential partners by typing a number into a box next to the information
about each of them. This preference based regrouping follows Bayer(forthcoming) and Page et al.
(2005).
7See Bayer (2011) for a discussion of the performance Stable Marriage Mechanism in a linear
VCM with endogenous regrouping. He explains the workings of the mechanism to the subjects
using almost identical language and finds that subjects generally base their preferences on con-
tribution levels, ranking potential partners based on their contribution history.
8Sample instructions from the experiment can be found in the online appendix.
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Table 1: Summary of Treatments Implemented
Treatment Cost to Dissolve Share of Cost paid by each partnerNo. of No. of Endogenous Option to Committed Unilateral Bilateral
Sessions Subjects Regrouping Commit Partnership Dissolution Dissolution
RandomMatching 2 30 No No - - -
No Commitment 3 56 Yes No - - -
Costless Pledge 3 58 Yes Yes 0 - -
Asymmetric Cost 3 60 Yes Yes 400 Instigator pays $400 Both pay $200Other pays $0
Shared Low Cost 3 50 Yes Yes 400 Both pay $200 Both pay $200
Shared High Cost 3 60 Yes Yes 800 Both pay $400 Both pay $400
Differences in contribution behaviour betweenNoCommitment andCostless Pledges
identify how a pure pledge of commitment influences cooperation in endoge-
nously formed partnerships (Research Question 1). Remaining differences be-
tween Costless Pledges and other experimental treatments highlight the impor-
tance of dissolution costs in enhancing cooperation (Research Question 2). Com-
paring cooperation levels between Shared Low Cost and Shared High Cost isolates
the role of the total cost burden (Research Question 3). Finally, the role of asym-
metry in costs is seen by comparing Shared Low Cost and Asymmetric Cost (Re-
search Question 4).
3.5 Implementation
We conducted seventeen sessions, two sessions of the Random Matching treat-
ment and three sessions for all other treatments described in Table 1. Between
16 and 20 subjects participated in each session, for a total of 314 participants. All
sessions were conducted at the Adelaide Laboratory for Experimental Economics
(AdLab) at the University of Adelaide. The experiment was computerized and
scripts were programmed using the z-Tree platform (Fischbacher (2007)). Sub-
jects were mainly undergraduate and graduate students from a variety of ma-
jors at the University of Adelaide recruited using the online recruitment system
ORSEE (Greiner (2015)). Approximately thirty percent of participants were ma-
joring in Commerce, Economics or Finance. Of the remaining seventy percent
most participants were from an Engineering, Law or Science background. Fifty
percent of participants were female. No subject participated inmore than one ses-
sion of the experiment. On average sessions lasted 90 minutes, including initial
instruction and payment of subjects. Subjects earned an average of $AUD 24.9
9Accumulated earnings were converted to Australian dollars at the predetermined exchange
rate of $E200 = $AUD1 at the end of each session.
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4. Results
4.1 Average Contributions
Figure 2: Average Individual Contributions by Treatment
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Figure 2 illustrates the time path of individual contributions averaged across sub-
jects in each of the six treatments. The top panels show average contributions by
period. Average contributions per sequence of four periods are shown in the
lower panels. Table A in the Appendix shows the corresponding average contri-
butions by sequence for each treatment along with the overall average. Added to
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this table are themedian and the standard deviation of contributions. We observe
substantial differences in contributions between treatments. Average contribu-
tions are highest in the Shared High Cost and Costless Pledge treatments (77.81
and 76.98 respectively) followed in turn by the No Commitment (72.21), Shared
Low Cost (71.68), Asymmetric Cost (70.21) and RandomMatching (53.03).
Table 2: Mann Whitney U-test Results - Overall Efficiency
No Costless Asymmetric Shared Low Shared High
Commitment Pledge Cost Cost Cost
All Sequences
RandomMatching 8:463??? 10:587??? 7:790??? 8:440??? 10:921???
No Commitment - 3:055??? 0:064 0:762 3:709???
Costless Pledge - - 2:899??? 4:178??? 0:585
Asymmetric Cost - - - 1:144 3:547???
Shared Low Cost - - - - 5:096???
Sequences 1-4
RandomMatching 6:071??? 7:418??? 5:569??? 4:731??? 8:276???
No Commitment - 1:539 0:218 2:241?? 2:822???
Costless Pledge - - 1:735? 4:196??? 1:430
Asymmetric Cost - - - 2:197?? 3:048???
Shared Low Cost - - - - 5:666???
Sequences 5-8
RandomMatching 5:893??? 7:630??? 5:489??? 7:212??? 7:184???
No Commitment - 2:755??? 0:291 1:287 2:411??
Costless Pledge - - 2:444?? 1:898? 0:450
Asymmetric Cost - - - 0:588 2:090??
Shared Low Cost - - - - 1:664?
Notes: Absolute value of the z-statistic reported is for the Mann-Whitney U-test
that average individual contributions per sequence (of four periods) are equal
between treatments. Significance Levels: p < 0:10, p < 0:05,p < 0:01.
Mann Whitney pairwise statistical tests comparing the contributions between
treatments yield the results shown in Table 2. The unit of observation is the aver-
age contribution of individual subjects per sequence.10 The results confirm what
was seen graphically in Figure 2: Contributions are highest in the Costless Pledge
and Shared High Cost treatments. There is no statistical difference in contribu-
tions between these two treatments overall. Contributions in Shared Low Cost
are below those in No Commitment over the first four sequences, but similar over
the last four sequences. There is no difference in contributions between the No
10If we use individual contributions per period all differences are significant at p < 0:01. In
the Mann-Whitney U tests using sequence averages across all periods we have 240 indepen-
dent observations for Random Matching, 448 for No Commitment, 464 for Costless Pledge, 480
for Asymmetric Cost, 400 for Shared High Cost and 480 for Shared High Cost. Dividing the
sequences into first- and second-half of the treatment means the number of independent obser-
vations by treatment is divided by a factor of two.
9
Commitment and Asymmetric Cost treatment. All treatments with endogenous
regrouping feature higher contributions than RandomMatching.
Observation 1. Overall cooperation is highest in the Costless Pledge and Shared High
Cost treatments and lowest under Random Matching. In the Asymmetric Cost and No
Commitment treatments contributions are similar, lying above Random Matching but
below the best performing treatments. In the Shared Low Cost treatment, cooperation
gradually increases to a level equal to the No Commitment treatment.
Table 3: Treatment Efficiency Ranking
All Sequences Sequences 1 - 4 Sequences 5 - 8
Ranking Treatment Ranking Treatment Ranking Treatment
1 Shared High Cost 1 Shared High Cost 1 Shared High Cost
1 Costless Pledge 2 Costless Pledge 1 Costless Pledge
3 Shared Low Cost 2 Asymmetric Cost 3 Shared Low Cost
3 Asymmetric Cost 2 No Commitment 3 Asymmetric Cost
3 No Commitment 5 Shared Low Cost 3 No Commitment
6 RandomMatching 6 RandomMatching 6 RandomMatching
Notes: Ranking based on Mann Whitney U-test Results that average individual profits
per sequence (of four periods) are equal between treatments.
Higher contributions do not necessarily translate one-to-one with higher welfare
because of the payoff reducing costs associated with partnership dissolution in
some treatments. To assess whether dissolution costs effect the welfare rank-
ing we run the same Mann-Whitney U-tests on average sequence profits for each
treatment. Results of these tests yield the efficiency rankings displayed in Table 3.
These rankings highlight that Shared High Cost and Costless Pledges yield equal
gains in efficiency and are the only treatments that outperform the No Commit-
ment treatment over the duration of the experiment.
In the remaining subsections we dig deeper into the data to explain how these
efficiency differences arise. Next we look at cooperation levels for committed and
uncommitted partners in each treatment. We then turn to analyse differences in
the proportion of committed partnerships by treatment. Finally, we investigate
dissolution decisions of subjects.
4.2 Commitment Status and Contributions
Figure 3 disaggregates average contribution profiles for committed and uncom-
mitted subjects in each experimental treatment by sequence. In each panel, the
average contribution of subjects in the No Commitment treatment is included as
a reference. Table B in the Appendix presents the average contributions by treat-
ment and sequence corresponding to Figure 3. The figure clearly documents that
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Figure 3: Average Contributions by Commitment Status and Sequence
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committed partnerships are associated with higher average contributions than
uncommitted partnerships for all treatments except Asymmetric Cost. Contribu-
tions also lie above the No Commitment benchmark.
To tease out the relative effectiveness of commitment on increasing contributions
of committed subjects between treatments we run a series of Mann-Whitney U
tests. We compare the average contribution levels of committed subjects per se-
quence across treatments. Table 4 presents the results for all sequences and those
disaggregated into the first and last four sequences. The results show that con-
tributions of committed subjects are similar in Costless Pledge, Shared Low Cost
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Table 4: Differences in Contributions of Committed Subjects
Asymmetric Shared Low Shared High
Cost Cost Cost
All Sequences
Costless Pledge 4:243??? 0:505 2:436???
Asymmetric Cost - 3:544??? 5:152???
Shared Low Cost - - 1:871?
Sequences 1-4
Costless Pledge 2:381??? 0:049 1:712
Asymmetric Cost - 1:679? 3:018???
Shared Low Cost - - 1:593
Sequences 5-8
Costless Pledge 3:745??? 0:539 1:572
Asymmetric Cost - 3:261??? 4:232???
Shared Low Cost - - 1:001
Notes: Absolute value of the z-statistic reported is for
the Mann-Whitney U-test that average individual
contributions per sequence (of four periods) are equal
between treatments. Significance Levels: p < 0:10,
p < 0:05,p < 0:01.
and Shared Hight Cost. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal average
contributions of committed subjects in all pairwise tests between Costless Pledge,
Shared Low Cost and Shared High Cost. This confirms what we see graphically
in Figure 3. We can also see that the Asymmetric Cost treatment is the least
successful of all treatments in getting committed subjects to overcome the social
dilemma.
Observation 2. Contributions of committed partners are higher than a No Commitment
benchmark when there are no costs to dissolve committed partnerships, or these costs
fall equally. There is no treatment difference in the contributions of committed subjects
between Costless Pledge, Shared Low Cost and Shared High Cost. Committed subjects
in Asymmetric Cost perform the worst, with contributions lower than subjects in the No
Commitment reference.
This result provides a first glance at the mechanisms driving the treatment differ-
ences in overall cooperation and efficiency. The gain in efficiency documented in
Observation 1 in Shared High Cost and Costless Pledge is driven by the higher
contributions of committed subjects. However, this increase in cooperation alone
cannot fully explain the efficiency result because it does give rise to the rankings
in Table 3. In particular it cannot explain why Shared Low Cost does not perform
better than No Commitment. We now look to commitment rates and dissolution
decisions to provide further evidence of the mechanisms at work.
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4.3 Proportion of Committed Partnerships
Figure 4: Proportion of Committed Partnerships by Treatment
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The proportion of committed partnerships across treatments and sequences are
shown in Figure 4. The proportion is highest in the Costless Pledge treatment,
staying above eighty percent in all sequences. A test of proportions confirms that
the commitment rate is higher in Costless Pledge than any other treatment (p <
0:01 for all pairwise comparisons). In sequences five and six every partnership in
Costless Pledge is committed.
Variations in the distribution of dissolution costs between partners leads to sig-
nificantly different proportions of committed partnerships. The proportion is
higher in Asymmetric Cost, where only the partner choosing to dissolve a com-
mitted partnership pays a cost, compared to treatments where the dissolution
costs are equally shared between partners (p < 0:01 for pairwise tests of pro-
portions compared to Shared Low Cost and Shared High Cost). There is no sig-
nificant difference between Shared Low Cost and Shared High Cost, where the
distribution of costs remains constant.
Observation 3. Partnerships are most likely to be committed when there are no cost to
13
dissolving unsuccessful partnerships. The distribution of dissolution costs matter, there
are more committed partnerships when costs are borne only by partners who instigate
dissolution compared to when costs are equally shared by both partners.
Observations 2 and 3 suggest that treatment differences in overall efficiency doc-
umented in Table 3 are driven in part by composition effects. Whilst average
contributions were similar in Costless Pledges and Shared Low Cost, there are
less committed partnerships in Shared Low Cost. The low proportion of high
contributing committed partnerships means that these cooperation gains did not
translate into treatment level welfare gains in Shared LowCost. At the same time,
the high proportion of committed partnerships in Costless Pledge mean the co-
operation increase did translate into treatment level welfare gains. This gain was
similar in magnitude to that in Shared High Cost.
This high proportion of committed partnerships in Costless Pledge combined
with the gains in cooperation in committed partnerships provide evidence that
costless pledges serve to signal or reassure a partner of cooperative intentions.
Furthermore, these are effective in leading to higher cooperation levels in com-
mitted partnerships when partnership formation is endogenous because partners
act on these intentions. This stands in contrast to (Camera et al. (2010)) who show
that structured pledges of commitment are ineffective at increasing cooperation
under exogenous regrouping protocol.
4.4 Partnership Dissolution
We now turn to analyze partnership dissolution decisions.11 Dissolution rates by
treatment and sequence are plotted in Figure 5. The left panel documents the
fraction of partnerships that are dissolved in the No Commitment and Costless
Pledge treatments. Dissolution rates for treatments where dissolving a commit-
ted partnership is costly are shown in the right panel. We can see the introduction
of commitment opportunities decreases the aggregate dissolution rate.12 These
11In the experiment we asked subjects to type free-form messages after dissolving their part-
nership to explain the reason for their decision. Nearly all subjects respond that they choose to
dissolve the partnership because investments were not high enough. This response is the most
common across treatments. Some subjects also respond that because they proposed to commit
and the other partner did not, they chose to dissolve
12Pairwise comparisons between No Commitment and both Costless Pledge and Shared Low
Cost reveal treatment differences at the 10% significance level ( Test of proportions, p < 0:09 for
Shared Cost and p < 0:08 for Costless Pledge). Treatment differences are significant at the 1%
level between No Commitment and both Asymmetric Cost and Shared High Cost respectively.
Across treatments where subject can choose to commit, the partnership dissolution rate in Asym-
metric Cost is lower than in all other treatments (p < 0:01 for all pairwise comparisons). There
is no significant difference in overall dissolution rates between the Costless Pledge, Shared Low
Cost and Shared High Cost treatments (p > 0:1 for all pairwise comparisons).
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treatment differences in dissolution rates documented in Figure 5 are a combina-
tion of two effects: the direct effect of commitment and an indirect effect through
changes in contributions. To disentangle the two effects we estimate a Random
Effects Linear Probability Model. The dependent variable in the regression is
the dissolution decision of each subject in a regrouping phase.13 The regression
coefficients are reported in Table 5.
Figure 5: Partnership Dissolution Rates by Treatment and Sequence
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Looking first at the coefficients on treatment indicators, only the Costless Pledge
coefficient is significantly different from zero. In all other treatments the intro-
duction of commitment opportunities has no effect on the dissolution decisions
of uncommitted subjects. Uncommitted subjects in Costless Pledge are more
likely to dissolve because these (few) uncommitted partnerships were unsuc-
cessful at achieving cooperation so subjects were dissolving their partnerships
frequently anticipating re-matching to a more cooperative partner. The negative
coefficients on the commitment - treatment interactions show subjects in commit-
13Treatment indicators are included as independent variables, as are interactions between
commitment status and the treatment indicator. The reference treatment is No Commitment -
where pledges of commitment were not available to subjects. We add the minimum and maxi-
mum contribution of a subject and their partner over a sequence as controls for contributions to
isolate the direct effect of commitment. Sequence indicators are added to control for time effects
and subject demographics such as age, gender and study major are added as additional controls.
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Table 5: Random Effects Linear Probabilty Model for Partnership Dissolution
(1) (2) (3)
Pr(Dissolve) RE LPM RE LPM RE LPM
Treatment Indicators
Costless Pledge 0.198*** 0.165** 0.169**
(0.0740) (0.0738) (0.0745)
Asymmetric Cost -0.000536 -0.0216 -0.0248
(0.0372) (0.0374) (0.0392)
Shared High Cost -0.00159 -0.00807 -0.00617
(0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0334)
Shared Low Cost -0.0292 -0.0320 -0.0347
(0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0354)
No Commitment reference treatment
Commitment Effects
Commit  Costless Pledge -0.222*** -0.188*** -0.192***
(0.0710) (0.0708) (0.0710)
Commit  Asymmetric Cost -0.252*** -0.216*** -0.205***
(0.0359) (0.0365) (0.0372)
Commit  Shared High Cost -0.131*** -0.107** -0.106**
(0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0457)
Commit  Shared Low Cost -0.116*** -0.101** -0.0953**
(0.0447) (0.0446) (0.0451)
Contributions controls
Own Max=10 0.0192*** 0.0183*** 0.0176***
(0.00526) (0.00524) (0.00530)
Own Min=10 -0.0229*** -0.0212*** -0.0215***
(0.00354) (0.00354) (0.00356)
Partner Max=10 -0.0323*** -0.0334*** -0.0334***
(0.00510) (0.00507) (0.00510)
Partner Min=10 -0.0286*** -0.0270*** -0.0264***
(0.00347) (0.00347) (0.00349)
Constant 0.676*** 0.742*** 0.716***
(0.0396) (0.0426) (0.0550)
Sequence Dummies YES YES
Demographics YES
% Pred 2 [0; 1] 0.88 0.78 0.78
u 0.121 0.121 0.124
e 0.298 0.296 0.296
R2 0.323 0.332 0.336
Observations 1,988 1,988 1,988
Number of Subjects 284 284 284
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ted partnerships are less likely to dissolve their partnership than their uncommit-
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ted counterparts in the same treatment. Compared to the reference treatment, No
Commitment, subjects in committed partnerships that are costly to dissolve are
less likely to break up their partnership. This is not true for Costless Pledge,
where committed subjects are as likely to dissolve compared with subjects in No
Commitment. The distribution of dissolution costs play an important role in the
dissolution decision. For a given contribution profile, committed subjects are
10.7% less likely to dissolve their partnership in Asymmetric Cost compared to
Shared Low Cost. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. There
is no difference in dissolution rates between treatments where the distribution of
costs remains unchanged.
Observation 4. The introduction of costly pledges of commitment decreases the likeli-
hood that committed partners choose to dissolve their partnership, but have no effect on
uncommitted partnerships. Dissolution rates are lowest when the cost burden falls solely
on the partner choosing to dissolve, but are no different when we scale up the cost holding
the distribution constant. Costless pledges have no effect on dissolution decisions of com-
mitted subjects compared to a setting where commitment opportunities are not available.
The decline in the likelihood of dissolution in Asymmetric Cost illustrates the
potential mechanism driving ineffectiveness of commitment to increase cooper-
ation in the treatment. Upon committing to a partnership, a subject (correctly)
anticipates that his partner is unwilling to choose to dissolve the partnership and
bear the high costs alone perceiving the cost too high or distribution unfair. In
response the subject begins to free-ride on his partner decreasing contributions.
If his partner is a conditional cooperator (Fischbacher et al. (2001), Fischbacher
and Gaechter (2010)), he in turn responds by decreasing cooperation. As a result
the partnership becomes trapped in a low-cooperation state with both partners
reluctant to dissolve. This suggests that the relatively large presence of commit-
ted partnerships in the treatment explains the lower treatment efficiency. Despite
the low contributing committed partnerships, treatment efficiency in Asymmet-
ric Cost does not fall below the No Commitment benchmark. In this treatment
uncommitted partnerships use the threat of costless dissolution to maintain high
levels of cooperation, mitigating the decline.
The regression results also highlight a difference in the mechanisms driving the
cooperation gains in Costless Pledge and Shared High Cost. In the Costless
Pledge treatment we have documented evidence that pledges can be used sig-
nalling cooperative intentions. Despite this signal and the rise in contributions
we do not see a decrease in partnership dissolution in this treatment relative to
No Commitment. This contrasts with Shared High Cost where we see a substan-
tial decline in breakups of committed partnerships. We interpret this result as an
alternative mechanism driving welfare gains in this treatment. Although fewer
subjects choose to commit in Shared High Cost, those that enter committed part-
nerships remain with their partner for longer. Cooperation is sustained in these
17
partnerships, unlike Asymmetric Cost, because partners respond to the threat of
credible dissolution by keeping contributions high.
5. Conclusion
We report on a set of experiments that were designed to investigate if pledges
of commitment enhance cooperation in endogenously formed partnerships. The
design isolates the role of the pledge of commitment separately from the effect
of costs incurred by partners when their partnership is dissolved. Our results
show pledges by themselves can yield increases in cooperation within commit-
ted partnerships and are welfare improving. In the Costless Pledge treatment
more than 80 percent of all partnerships feature mutual pledges of commitment.
These partnerships have higher rates of cooperation than a benchmark treatment
where commitment opportunities are removed. The results suggest that pledges
of commitment serve to signal cooperative intentions. Furthermore, once sub-
jects are committed they coordinate on higher contributions.
A specific focus of the experiment was to analyse how the size and distribution
of costs attached to dissolving committed partnerships influence cooperation. In
this dimension, our results emphasize the importance of costs being split be-
tween subjects when partnerships are dissolved. In two treatments where the
costs were equally split between partners we documented higher cooperation
levels in committed partnerships. In these cases, we found a similar increase
in cooperation among committed partnerships compared to the Costless Pledge
regime. For the Shared High Cost treatment this translated into welfare gains of
a similar magnitude to Costless Pledge. However, the adverse effect the intro-
duction of commitment had on uncommitted subjects in early sequences meant
no welfare gains were present in Shared Low Cost. In Asymmetric Cost, where
costs fell solely on the instigator of the breakup, cooperation levels fell. In this
treatment subjects anticipated the reluctance of their partner to dissolve the rela-
tionship and bear all the financial cost by free-riding.
Our results show that pledges of commitment by themselves, and with high and
equally shared dissolution costs, increase welfare in endogenously formed part-
nerships. When the total cost burden of equally shared costs is too low, or costs
fall only on instigators of breakups we find no effect on treatment level wel-
fare. This stands in contrast to the previously studied notions of costly sanctions
(Masclet et al. (2003)) and monetary punishment (Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr and
Gaechter (2000), Fehr and Gaechter (2002)) that have mixed effects on welfare
(Tan (2008)) and can be welfare decreasing. Furthermore, there is limited evi-
dence that costly sanctioning and punishment schemes are widely used outside
18
laboratory environments (Guala and Mittone (2005)), unlike voluntary associ-
ation and notions of commitment to a partnership. We document that group
formation when combined with pledges of commitment can increase coopera-
tion and welfare to a level similar to the best performing punishment treatments
(Nikiforakis and Normann (2008)). This increase in cooperation comes at both
zero cost with pure pledges and at a one-to-one ratio when dissolution costs are
equally shared, in contrast to the most effective punishment schemes that rely on
ratios above one-to-three.
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